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assumed that many small entrepreneurs have made similar concessions,
detrimental not only to their own interests but also to those of the public,
rather than incur the animosity of powerful labor groups. Since the
union frequently occupies a dominant economic position, attempted oppo-
sition may occasion financial ruin before legal refuge can be secured.
Hence, the small businessman may voluntarily submit to burdensome im-
positions and attempt to pass on to the public ensuing losses. He is
compensated for his concessions by the monopolistic competition which
characterizes such an industry.
That the public is vitally concerned with the contacts between unions
and the self-employed cannot be refuted. Their frequent controversies
indicate the necessity of devising a formula flexible enough to accommo-
date the interests of society with those of the adversaries. A construc-
tive remedial program would include legislation withdrawing this unique
problem from the scope of those enactments designed to cope with typical
labor-management disturbances. 4 It should embody a provision speci-
fically authorizing the courts to analyze all ramifications of union-self-
employed disputes. Assuredly, this would entail delegation of broad dis-
cretion to the judiciary. However, the widely divergent circumstances
giving rise to such discord demonstrate the importance of a flexible
process of decision. Similar in form to the early illegal purpose doctrine
but unrestricted by its array of precedent, this approach would permit
judicious reconciliation of all the interests involved.
Where the need for protection of the public interest arises out of
union-self-employer combination, the problem is one of augmenting in-
adequate natural competitive forces. Vigorous application of state anti-
trust provisions presents a convenient solution. That a labor organization
is a participant in the alliance does not vitiate this conclusion. Likewise
the fact that a localized trade, rather than a nationwide industry, is in-
volved does not mitigate the cumulative ill-effects upon the consumer.
FAIRNESS TO SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
SHAREHOLDERS DISSENTING FROM CONVERSION
TO FEDERAL CHARTER
Saving and loan associations,' in order to fulfill their primary func-
tions as savings institutions, uniformly arrange the greater part of their
48. See 34 MARQ. L. REv. 45, 48(1950-51).
1. They are frequently referred to as building and loan associations in many
states and as cooperative banks in Massachusetts.
NOTES
ownership equity into shares which the holders may withdraw with little
difficulty.2 However, the capital structures exhibited by many of these
associations, operating under state charters, are varied and often quite
complex. The patterns range from those in which all shares are withdraw-
able and have equal rights to associations with permanent capital stock,
withdrawable preferred stock, and/or deposits. 3 Congress, in 1933, au-
thorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to charter savings and loan
associations which fulfill the requirements of membership in a Federal
Home Loan Bank.4 With the exception that preferred stock may be sold
to the United States Treasury,5 federally chartered associations must be
entirely mutual in character with all shares withdrawable.6
Associations previously chartered by a state may acquire a federal
charter if the state has given its consent.7 The Federal Act requires that
2. The shareholder receives the value of his shares plus dividends minus any
penalty for withdrawal before maturity. However, if there are not enough liquid assets
to meet the demand, the association may pay according to a statutory schedule. Gen-
erally the schedule provides for payments up to $1000 to the shareholders in order of
application. The application is then refiled as of the date of payment for any re-
maining claims. Reserves generally must not fall below six percent. See, e.g., CA.
GEN. LAws act 986, § 6.01 (Supp. 1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. c.14, § 13 (1947); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 18-2110 (Burns Repl. 1950) ; N.Y. BANKING LAw § 390; OHIo CODE ANN.
§ 9651 (1938).
3. Building and loan associations may have permanent capital stock in many states.
The permanent stock usually serves as security for preferred withdrawable stock or
deposits. See CAL. GEN. LAws ict 986, §§ 3.01, 3.02 (Supp. 1949) ; ME. REV. STAT. c.55,
§ 144 (1944) ; N. Y. BANKING LAv §§ 378, 382; OHIo CODE AN. § 9645 (1938). Per-
manent associations are expressly prohibited in Iowa. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 534.18, 534.24
(1949). For an analysis of the various types of shares in building and loan associations,
see BODFISH AND THEOBOLD, SAVINGS AND LOAN PRINCIPLES 131 (1938).
4. 48 STAT. 132 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1946).
5. The Secretary of the Treasury may subscribe to preferred shares in a fed-
eral association not to exceed $10,000 if recommended by. the Home Loan Bank
Board. The association must make provision for retirement of such shares within five
years after investment. 48 STAT. 128 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(g) (1946)'.
6. 24 C.F.R. 144.1. (Supp. 1951)
7. The court in Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Cleary, 296
U.S. 325 (1935), held that the conversion of a state chartered association to a federal
savings and loan association without the consent of the state was a violation of the
powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. It is doubtful that this would hold today in light of the Court's change in the
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941). However, Justice Cardozo indicated by dicta in the Cleary' case that if the
suit had been brought by a dissenting shareholder, the transformation of property
interests might be a violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Hopkins
Federal Savings and Loan Assoicatior v. Cleary, supra at 336. The question is almost
moot today since all states except Louisiana have consented to such conversions. An
area where conflict may arise is presented by the differences between state and federal
requirements in the amount of votes needed for conversion. However, at the present
time the Home Loan Bank Board abides by the state requirement. See note 8 infra.
It is not believed that the federal act gives voting rights in consideration of the
conversion to non-voting shareholders in state associations. See State v. Phoenix
Bank, 34 Conn. 205 (1867) (conversion of a state bank to a national bank).
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at least 51%o of the voting shareholders favor the conversion, 8 but most
states have conditioned their permission upon larger or class majorities. 9
The first case testing the rights of stockholders dissenting from a plan of
conversion to a federal charter by a state savings and loan association
places in focus the considerations involved in protecting minority in-
terests when charter alterations are proposed by these financial institu-
tions. An Ohio Appellate Court, in Opdyke v. Security Savings and
Loan Ass'n,10 limited its judicial review to that afforded ordinary cor-
porate charter amendments. The court held that the conversion, which
the dissenting shareholders alleged substantially reduced the voting power
and value of their shares without justification, would not be blocked
absent a showing of fraud or gross unfairness."
The application in the Opdyke case of rules developed in corporate
charter amendment cases is not surprising. Such charter revisions in-
volve questions of minority rights analogous to those encountered in a
switch by a state chartered association to a federal charter, and the rules
to be followed in the former situation are rather well established. The
state legislatures originally extended broad powers of charter amend-
ments to corporations.' 2 Because of the legislative failure to specifically
curtail the exercise of these powers, the courts have erected equitable
limitations for the protection of minority interests. 13 However, charter
8. "Any member of the Federal Home Loan Bank nay convert itself into a federal
association . . . upon a vote of 51% of the votes cast at a legal meeting to consider
such action . . . . Such member shall comply with all laws if any, of its jurisdiction
which expressly provide for conversion. . . ." 24 C.F.R. 143.8 (Supp. 1951).
9. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 14, § 46 (1947) (three fourths of outstanding shares);
MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 170, § 50A (1948), N.Y. BANKING LAW § 409 (two thirds of
outstanding shares. Indiana requires that the conversion be done by sale of assets,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2102 (Burns Repl. 1950), and a vote of two thirds of the out-
standing shares is necessary to effect the sale. Id. § 18-804.
10. 99 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio 1951). The case was being appealed to the Ohio Su-
preme Court, Case" No. 32,631, at the time this note was written.
11. For some excellent articles on judicial review of charter amendments, see
Becht, Changes in Interests of Stockholders, 36 CORNEL., L.Q. 1 (1950); Curran,
Minority Stockholders and Amendmtents to the Corporate Charter, 32 Micn. L. REv.
743 (1934) ; Dodd, Dissenting Stockhwlders and Amendnents to the Corporate Charter,
75 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 585 (1927). The elimination of accrued dividends on preferred
stock through charter revision has given rise to the greateft comment. See Dodd, Fair
and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HAv. L. RaV. 780 (1942); Latty, Fairness-The
Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REv. 1 (1942);
Meck, Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stock: The Legal Doctrine, 55
HAv. L. RZEv. 71 (1942).
12. Although the corporate charter has been held to be a contract between the
state and the corporation, the corporation and the stockholders, and the stockholders
inter se since Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S.
1819), the courts continuously have held that such changes could be made where the
state has expressly or impliedly reserved this power. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIoNs 653
(3rd ed. 1946).
13. Ibid.
NOTES
amendments ordinarily will be enjoined only if the dissenters prove
fraud, gross unfairness, or bad faith on the part of.the majority over
a presumption of good faith. Except in New Jersey, unfairness or
prejudice to minority stockholders short of constructive. fraud will not
be judicially prevented. 14 Under the contract theory of corporate char-
ters all shareholders are said to agree, at least constructively, to changes
adopted by the required majority vote.15 Moreovcr, in many instances
dissenters may force the corporation to purchase their shares upon proper
demand in accordance with state appraisal statutes.16
The approach as crystallized by these rules has been severely criti-
cized, even when applied to non-financial institutions, as not adequately
protecting minority interests.1 7  Some charter amendments, while not
openly fraudulent, seemingly represent attempts by the corporate man-
agement to fortify its position with the indorsement of the majority
stockholders at the expense of a minority too small to prevent the
change. 18 Recognizing the desirability of holding the majority to a
higher standard of conduct, a line of federal cases has found a fiduciary
duty owing by the majority to minority groups. These cases, stemming
from Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.,19 accept as settled law that a stockholder
may vote in furtherance of his own interest and that charter amendments
cannot be enjoined short of fraud. But if any substantial interests of
the minority are harmed, the concomitant breach of the majority's
fiduciary duty may be redressed in money damages.20
14. Id. at 656. In Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.
1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1944), the district judge found the amendment
unfair and prejudicial to the minority but was powerless to intervene since Delaware
law controlled and the evidence did not support "gross unfairness" or "fraud."
Professor Latty quotes a Wall Street banker as saying that many of the expla-
nations for removing accrued arrearages are simply "hocus pocus" disguising the
exploitation of the financial innocence of the preferred holders. Latty, supra note 11,
at 13.
15. See Dodd, supra note 11, at 589. -
16. For a collection of these statutes and a discussion of apportionment of the
costs of appraisal, see Note, 60 YALE LJ. 337 (1951). "Fair value" is a very in-
definite standard but it is generally construed to mean the 'fair value in a going
concern. It is usually near the market price of the stock. For a discussion of the
effectiveness of these statutes, see BALLANTINE, CoaroRAlONs 704 (3rd ed. 1946);
Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 MicH. L. REV. 1165 (1940); Lattin,
Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HA v. L. Rxv.
233 (1931).
17. See articles cited in note 11 supra.
18. Ibid. BALLANTINE, CoPtoRATIoNs 656 (3d ed. 1946).
19. 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941).
20. After refusing to enjoin the dissolution of the company because there was no
showing of fraud, Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1936), ihe court
allowed the minority damages because of the failure of the majority to obtain a fair
value for the assets of the corporation upon dissolution. Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.
125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941). See also Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation, 162 F.2d
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Although this fiduciary duty concept is perhaps based upon faulty
logic, 21 its extension would do much to protect minority interests when
damages are relatively ascertainable, as in liquidations, or where the
market value of th dissenters' stock has been visibly reduced. However,
damages are a difficult and uncertain remedy when the affected values
are not primarily monetary, such as a loss of voting power or security.
Nevertheless, more thoroughgoing judicial remedies are improbable, in
the absence of legislative action,22 due to the restraint of stare decisis and
reluctance to interfere with managerial business judgment.
Stare decisis, however, need not constitute a bar to a full considera-
tion of the judicial review to be given charter conversions by savings
and loan associations. In addition to technical and theoretical divergence
from corporate charter amendments, and the arguments advanced against
the lenient review afforded in such cases, 23 there are cogent reasons for
applying a stricter standard in the conversion situation. Savings and
loan associations are quasi-public corporations providing depositories
for the savings of the general public. 24 The shareholders are concerned
primarily with security for their savings rather than the relatively small
profit which they may receive on their investment. 2  The states have
sought to assure this security through close regulation of the business
practices of the associations. 26 Judicial approval of charter conversions
detrimental to the interests of any of the shareholders is hardly con-
sistent with this policy, or with the function of savings and loan asso-
ciations.
46 (3d Cir. 1947) breach of fiduciary obligation when minority uninformed of pend-
ing dissolution, was induced to redeem stock at a premium).
As yet this fiduciary doctrine has been applied only when there has been a single
dominant stockholder. However, the principle could logically be extended to cases where
the controlling group has obtained a majority through proxy votes. This is especially
true when the directors propose the amendment and gain the necessary majority from
management votes and proxies.
21. See Notes, 36 CALIF. L. REy.. 325 (1949), 10 U.oF CHI L. REv. 77 (1942).
22. The proposed Model Business Corporation Act of the American Bar Asso-
ciation requires that two thirds of the shareholders in any class affected by the
change in the charter must approve the plan. While this would be a step in con-
trolling exploitation, 'it does not protect against the effect of management proxies or
establish improved procedures for judicial review. Administrative review of corporate
recapitalizations is discussed in Note, 26 MINN. L. REV. 387, 395 (1942).
23. See articles cited in note 11 supra.
24. Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 325 (1935) ; Klein
v. Jefferson County Building and Loan Ass'n, 239 Ala. 460, 195 So. 593 (1940) ; People
ex rel. Barrett v. Logan County Building & Loan Ass'n, 369 Ill. 518, 17 N.E2d 4
(1938); In re Eleventh Ward Building & Loan Association of Newark, 130 N.J. Eq.
414, 21 A.2d 746 (1941), cert. denied, Schoff v. Eleventh Ward Building & Loan Ass'n
of Newark, 315 U.S. 799 (1941).
25. BODFiSH AND THEOBOLD, SAVINGS AND LoAN PRINCIPLES 1 (1938).
26. See statutes cited in note 34 infra.
NOTES
Association members subject to the greatest threat of detriment
from a conversion are the holders of non-withdrawable stock. Ordi-
narily, withdrawable shareholders can liquidate their holdings with little
if any loss should they dislike a prosposed federal incorporation. On
the othef hand, permanent stockholders in a state association would be
forced to accept withdrawable shares in the federal organization in
order that federal charter requirements may be met.2" Thus, the char-'
acter of their investment would undergo considerable change and a pos-
sible substantial interest in surplus and reserves would vanish.2 8 Al-
though non-withdrawable stocks are perhaps a more speculative invest-
ment than withdrawable shares or deposits, investors in permanent
stocks normally must accept a lower potential rate of return, in exchange
for increased security, than regular corporate stockholders may expect.
Furthermore, the policy of protecting savings and loan investors, evi-
denced by strict governmental supervision, extends to all shareholders.
Preservation of the legitimate interests of all stockholders could be
more readily achieved by requiring fairness to all affected parties in
the plan of conversion. Under the standard of fairness, advocated by
some leading writers for all corporate charter revisions, 2 9 the majority
could not deprive a minority of a substantial interest without good busi-
ness reasons, i.e., purposes designed to benefit the organization as a whole,
and unless a fair equivalent is given in return.30 The dissenters first
would have to establish the approximate extent to which their position
has been changed. 3 ' This could be a decrease in voting power, a reduc-
tion in the relative value of their shares, or the loss of a preferred
position.
The alleged reduction in the value of the dissenters' shares did
not alone raise the question of unfairness in the Opdyke case, since there
any decrease also affected the majority. However, only permanent stock-
holders had voting rights under the state charter, while all were to
have votes proportionate to the value of their shares in the mutual
federal association. The voting power of all the permanent shares was
accordingly reduced from 100 percent to four percent3 2 and that of each
27. 24 C.F.R. 144.1 (Supp. 1951). A few states expressly give a right of ap-
praisal and purchase of shares to stockholders who do not wish to continue in the new
association. See FLA. STAT. § 665.42 (1949) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-1009 (1938).
28. In permanent stock associations, generally only the permanent stockholders
have rights to surplus and reserves upon dissolution. In the mutual association all share-
holders participate in the distribution of these funds.
29. See articles cited in note 11 supra.
30. Latty, supra note 11, at 21.
31. Id. at 50; Becht, supra note 11, at 30.
32: Transcript of Record, pp. 266-67, Opdyke v. Security Savings and Loan
Ass'n, 99 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio 1951).
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permanent stockholder, including the dissenters who sought to enjoin
the conversion, was decreased proportionately. The court rejected the
plaintiffs' contention that the large increase in voting members better
enabled the current management to perpetuate its control. Nevertheless,
the right to vote was newly conferred principally upon the small share-
holders who usually vote by proxy. And in practice the proxy vote
has operated to strengthen the control of the management because of its
advantageous position in soliciting proxies. 33
Even if conversion does cause a significant change in the position
of some shareholder groups, the majority should be able to prove suffi-
cient justification and the offering of a fair equivalent if the plan was
adopted in good faith. This could consist of a potential increase in
earning power or some general public benefit, such as significantly in-
creased protection to the savings investors. The latter would rarely
occur in savings and loan association conversions since federal regula-
tions provide no greater security than is true in most states. 34 Moreover,
both the state and federal associations may become members of a Federal
Home Loan Bank and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration. 35 Therefore, in most instances, any justification must lie in
the business advantages of the conversion.
It is frequently asserted that the word "Federal" in the name of
an association is a business advantage in that it has a magical attraction,
inspiring investor confidence. The generally better financial position of
33. BALLANTINE, COIPORAT1ONs 412 (3d ed. 1946). See Friedman, Expenses of
Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 CoL. L. REV. 951 (1951).
34. It is recognized that this observation cannot be supported by only a few facts,
but by way of illustration there follow representative citations concerning the com-
parative reserve requirements and lending restrictions on real estate loans.
Reserve requirements. California: 10% of outstanding investment certificates, CAL.
GEN. LAws act 986, § 2.10 (Supp. 1949) ; Illinois: not less than five nor more than ten
percent of profits until reserves amount to 7Y20% of dues capital, ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 145, §31 (1947); Indiana: 3% of gross profits until 10% of total assets, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 18-2122 (Burns Repl. 1950); Massachusetts: 1-5% of net profits until 10%
of total liabilities, MAss. ANN. LAWS. c. 170, § 45 (1948) ; New York: 5% of net
profits until 10% of capital or 50% of real estate whichever is higher, N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 387; Ohio: 5% of net earnings until 10% of total assets, OHIO CODE ANN.
§ 687, (1938). Federal associations: 5% of net earnings until 10% of capital, 24
C.F.R. 144.1 (Supp. 1951).
Per cent of value of real estate on which mortgages may be made. California: 80%,
CAL. GEN. LAWS act 986, § 910 (Supp. 1949); Indiana: 801, IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 18-2125' (Burns Repl. 1950); New York: 60%, N.Y. BANKING LAW § 380; Massa-
chusetts: 80%, MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 170, § 27 (1948) ; Ohio: 75%, OIO CODE ANN.
§ 9657 (1938). Federal Associations: 80%, 24 C.F.R. 145.6-1 (Supp. 1951).
35. Membership in the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation is per-
missive with state associations and mandatory for federal associations. 48 STAT. 1285
(1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1726 (1946). The same is true regarding membership
in the Federal Home Loan Bank. 47 STAT. 725 (1932), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1424
(1946).
NOTES
the federal associations is cited in support of this theory.30 However,
it seems probable that the more aggressive management of the federal
association' accounts for their great financial strength.37 The name alone
is seldom an important factor.
A possible justification and basis for the. substitution of a satis-
factory equivalent in the form of increased earnings is the greater
flexibility of federal loan and reserve policies than those of some states.38
Another is a conceivable increase in income available for distribution
to shareholders following changes in the capital structure.3 9 Although
not a consideration when the Opdyke case was decided, the Internal
Revenue Act of 1951 adds possible important tax advantages when
conversion from an association with permanent shares is sought. The
exemption from federal income tax of both state and federal associations
was removed, 40 but specific allowances *were made for deduction of
dividends paid to mutual shareholders 41 and for bad debt reserves. 42
In addition, exemption from excess profits tax is granted to associations
without capital stock.43  Hence, upon conversion to a federal mutual
association larger earnings may become available for distribution to
those who previously held permanent stock.
The procedure utilized in the Opdyke case did not clearly reveal
whether the management had good business reasons for converting, or
was merely attempting to prevent an aggressive minority from gaining
control of the association. It was simply established to the court's
satisfaction that neither the reduction in the plaintiffs' voting power nor
the value of the shares they were alloted in the federal association to
replace their permanent stock was fraudulent or so grossly unfair as to
constitute onstructive fraud.
Failure to exact fairness to minority interests in charter conversions
by savings and loan associations probably raises no serious constitutional
question today despite the intimation in the Cleary case that arbitrary
36. Of the 5,980 associations which were doing business at the end of 1948, 1505
were federal associations and the remainder were state-chartered institutions. The
former group accounted for $7.1 billion, or nearly 50%, of the $14.7 billion of the
total assets of all associations. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, 1946-1948 STATISTICAL SUM-
MARY, TABLE 4 (1949).
37. PAR=, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN BUSINESS 71 (Unpublished thesis in the
Indiana University School of Business Library, 1949).
38. See statutes cited in note 34 supra.
39. See Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 208-211.
40. Revenue Act of 1951, § 313, 65 STAT. 4.90 (1951). See SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 26-29 (1951).
41. INT. REV. CoDE § 23 (r).
42. Id. §23 (k) (1).
43. Id. § 454.
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changes in stockholder interests could violate due process. 4   However,
the Home 'Owners Loan Act subjects these conversions to "such rules
and regulations as the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board may pre-
scribe. ' ' 45 Presently, the Board exercises slight supervision over the
manner in which interested groups are affected, and the dissenters in
the Opdyke case were refused a hearing before approval of the plan
of conversion by the Board.4 G However, a regulation specifies that non-
withdrawable shareholders must receive savings accounts equivalent to
the value of their stock, 47 and the Board could well condition approval
of future conversions upon the fairness of the plan of conversion to
all concerned.
Adoption of the proposed standard of fairness to test all corporate
charter amendments, as well as savings and loan conversions, would
necessitate a clear revelation of the purpose behind a proposed change
and thus facilitate critical evaluation. There would be increased assurance
that the broad power of charter amendment and rechartering are em-
ployed only when beneficial to the corporation as a whole, and not for
the selfish advantage of the group in control. And especially in regard
to savings and loan associations, the security expectations of investors
would be more adequately safeguarded. Finally, there can be no possible
constitutional or statutory question of the equitable nature of the change
if it can satisfy a requirement of fairness.
An unfair corporate charter revision should not be permitted merely
because the dissenters may have the choice of forcing the corporation
to purchase their shares under an appraisal statute. Such acts are in-
tended to afford, not a complete remedy, but a privilege of withdrawal
to those who for personal reasons do not wish to continue in the corpora-
tion.48 Additionally, there is little warrant for compelling the minority
to choose between withdrawing from a business in which it may have
a considerable interest and being unfairly discriminated against. Simi-
larly, interference with managerial business judgment resulting from a
more stringent standard of review is not an unanswerable objection.
Inasmuch as business judgment is exercised reasonably for the benefit
44. See note 7 supra.
45. 48 STAT. 132 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i) (1946).
46. Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 17, 22, 89, 267.
47. 24 C.F.R. 143.9(b) (4) (Supp. 1951).
48. Many states hold that appraisal is a privilege granted to dissenters, and the
absence of appraisal statutes does not make the charter amendment unconstitutional.
Beechwood Securities Corp. v. Associated Oil Co., 104 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1939) ; In re
Interborough Consolidated Corp., 288 Fed. 334 (2nd Cir. 1923); Mayfield v. Alton
R.R. Gas and Electric Co., 198 Ill. 582, 65 N.E. 100 (1902); Thompson v. Indiana
Union Traction Co., 183 Ind. 690, 110 N.E. 121 (1915). Contra: Nice Ball Bearing
Co. v. Mortgage Building and Loan Association, 310 Pa. 560, 166 Ati. 239 (1933).
NOTES
of the corporation and all of its owners, little difficulty in justifying a
charter amendment should be experienced.
A third, and perhaps more valid, criticism of adherence to a
standard of fairness is the possible resulting increase in vexatious litiga-
tion against the corporation by opportunistic stockholders. The man-
agement logically might be more eager to settle such suits rather than
suffer the expense and delay of litigation and the greater risk that the
proposed change will be disallowed because of the closer judicial review.
However, vexatious litigation is a danger whatever the standard of
review, and the delay and expense which it engenders will be much
the same. Requiring the plaintiff to show that the proposed charter is
unfair to him before the corporation need prove justification and the
offering of a fair equivalent would cause the early termination of com-
pletely unreasonable suits. In any event, legitimate dissenters should not
be penalized merely to alleviate occasional perversions of the judicial
process, especially since some remedies against mere contentiousness are
available.
A party obtaining a temporary restraining order must post a bond
sufficient to reimburse the one restrained for losses occasioned by the
resulting delay, if the order should eventually prove to be unjustified. 4 9
Also, corporations may resort to the same tort remedies against vexatious
litigation as are open to others. Most American jurisdictions permit
an action in the nature of malicious prosecution to be maintained for
unjustifiable civil proceedings resulting in actual damages. 50  A suit
for abuse of process may be brought should the stockholder have reason-
able grounds for his action, but has instituted it to attain some unjust
end, such as a personal settlement.51- The courts place a heavy burden
upon plaintiffs in these actions to avoid discouraging adverse parties
from legitimately testing their questionable rights,52 and they are
remedies seldom attempted by corporations. Nevertheless, it seems
preferable to relegate business organizations to these devices rather than
overlook abuses of the charter amendment and conversion powers.
49. E.g. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (c) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 109, § 357 (1947) ; OHIO CODE
ANN. § 11882 (1938) ; N.J. R. Civ. P. 3:65-4.
50. PROSSER, TORTS 866 (1941). In order to sustain such an action one must prove
malice and lack of probable cause for bringing the action. Malice on the part of
the dissenter may be a primary motive of ill will, lack of belief in the success of the
action, or an attempt to obstruct for personal gain; but this may be inferred from lack
of probable cause. Id. at 886-890.
51. Id. at 892.
52. Id. at 886. It is generally thought that the actions of abuse of process and
wrongful civil proceedings should not be allowed by counterclaim. The deterrent to
reasonable litigation outweighs procedural advantages. If counterclaims were allowed
almost every complaint would be answered with a counterclaim for wrongful civil
proceedings. See Note, 58 YALE L.J. 490 (1949).
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While any extensions of judicial limitation on misuses of the charter
amendment power is more likely to follow the fiduciary duty approach
of the Lebold decision, charter conversions by savings and loan associa-
tions present an opportunity to institute a standard of fairness unham-
pered by the restraints of stare decisis. Minority investors will then be
better safeguarded against discriminatory treatment and deprivation of
their security expectations under the guise of managerial "business
judgment."53
RIGHTS OF INTERIM CREDITORS
UNDER CHAPTER XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Federal bankruptcy legislation, continuously in effect since 1898,
has played an important role in clearing the wreckage left by business
failures. Following the havoc wrought by the depression during the
early nineteen thirties, the emphasis has shifted from liquidation of
insolvent firms to reorganization and rehabilitation. It is thought that
greater benefit will inure, in the long run, to the debtor, his creditors,
and the economic system if the organization is permitted to continue
operation under a readjusted financial structure.'
An important segment of the Federal Bankruptcy Act implementing
this restorative purpose is Chapter XI.2  The Chapter provides ma-
chinery whereby embarrassed debtors, individual or corporate, may work
out an arrangement with creditors. 3 The debtor alone may propose the
plan of arrangement, 4 perhaps with the assistance of a creditors' com-
mittee. 5 After acceptance by the creditors, the plan must be submitted
53. Following this writing the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed 4-2, the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Opdyke v. Security Savings and Loan Ass'n, 105 N.E.2d 9
(Ohio 1952). The court confined itself largely to constitutional questions and held
that the problems raised by the valuation of the shares and the change in voting
rights were of fact and there was sufficient evidence for the courts below to find
an absence of fraud. Id. 25-26. They held that a determination of violation of the con-
tract clause need not be decided since the merger of another association with Security
in 1943 constituted the formation of a new corporation subsequent to the statute granting
the power to convert to a federal association.
1. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, BANKRUPTCY AND ARRANGEMENT PROCEEDINGS
1 (1951).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1946).
3. See Rickles, Chapter XI Arrangements, 55 Com. L.J. 173 (1950).
4. This should be contrasted with a Chapter X proceeding where the plan is
generally instituted by the trustee or others such as a creditors' committee. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 569, 570 (1946); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, B.AKRUPTCY AND ARRANGEMENT PRO-
CEFDINGS 131 (1951).
5. The creditors' committee may act only in an advisory capacity since it is solely
the function of the debtor to finally propose a satisfactory plan. The debtor must
include a plan as part of his original petition. 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1946).
